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Constructing the ‹Media Competent› Child: 
Media Literacy and Regulatory Policy in the UK 
 
Over the past fifteen years, sociologists have mounted an influential chal-
lenge to traditional psychological accounts of childhood. The new socio-
logy of childhood has presented a powerful critique of the developmentalist 
view of children as merely ‹adults in the making›. Such a view, it is argued, 
judges children only in terms of what they will become in the future, once 
they have been adequately socialised: they are seen as inherently vulner-
able, incomplete and dependent. The notion of competence has been a key 
term in this argument: children, it is suggested, need to be seen as auto-
nomous agents, who are self-regulating, competent to make their own 
decisions and to negotiate with adults on an equal basis. (For instances of 
this approach, see James and Prout, 1990; James, Jenks and Prout, 1998; 
Mayall, 1994, 2002.) This view is not confined to academic research. It is 
also widely recognised by professionals working in children’s services; and 
to some extent, it has been enshrined in legislation relating to children’s 
rights. 
Sociologists of childhood have largely neglected the role of the media, 
despite their self-evident significance in children’s lives. Yet there are clear 
parallels between the approach I have outlined and that adopted by many 
media researchers. Qualitative research on children’s uses and inter-
pretations of media – particularly within the Cultural Studies tradition – has 
increasingly moved away from the notion that children are merely innocent 
and vulnerable, and hence in need of adult ‹protection›. On the contrary, 
children are now seen as an ‹active› audience: they possess a form of 
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‹media literacy› – in effect, of ‹media competence› – that enables them to 
make sophisticated, critical judgments about what they watch and read. 
(For instances of this approach, see Buckingham, 1993; Davies, 2001; 
Tobin, 2000.) Some popular commentators have gone further, suggesting 
that children are in many respects more competent than adults in their 
dealings with media and digital technology (see McDonnell, 1993; 
Rushkoff, 1996; Tapscott, 1998). Here again, such arguments are also 
widely accepted by practitioners: media producers are increasingly inclined 
to argue that children are a demanding, ‹media-wise› audience that is 
difficult to persuade and to satisfy.  
One of the most evident dangers of this approach, however, is that it may 
lead to a celebratory stance. As I have argued elsewhere (Buckingham, 
2000), this approach provides a useful corrective to traditional views of 
children as merely passive victims of media influence; but in many respects 
it is just as sentimental as the approach it seeks to displace. In line with 
Romantic views of childhood, children are seen here to possess a form of 
spontaneous, natural wisdom that somehow automatically protects them 
from corruption. To this extent, any kind of adult intervention would seem 
to be quite superfluous – if not an unwarranted imposition of adult power. 
For example, in terms of education, it is hard to see where such views 
might lead – for if children are already competent in their dealings with 
media, it is far from clear what remains for them to learn. Likewise, it is 
hard to see any basis here for regulating the media – whether ‹negatively›, 
in terms of restricting children’s access, or ‹positively›, in terms of 
provision that will meet the specific needs of children. 
In this article, I want to consider how recent research on children and 
media relates to public policy, and specifically to current debates about 
media regulation in the UK. Debates about the media are obviously an 
important arena for contemporary concerns about childhood. For example, 
current debates about paedophiles on the internet, the influence of violent 
video games or television, or the possibility of banning advertising aimed 
at children, clearly reflect much broader tensions and anxieties to do with 
the place of children and their status or power relative to adults. Changes in 
media policy relating to children inevitably invoke much broader 
assumptions and discourses about childhood – not least about children’s 
competence (or incompetence), and how that might be defined. My article 
addresses a very specific set of debates that are currently taking place in 
Britain around changes in media policy; but it goes on to address some 
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broader questions about where researchers and educators stand in these 
debates, and how we might intervene in them.  
 
Changing Policies 
Late in 2003, the British government passed a new Communications Act. It 
was a comprehensive, far-reaching, although in some ways rather contra-
dictory, piece of legislation. The key move was to combine the regulation 
of telecommunications media and broadcasting (or at least some aspects of 
broadcasting, because the BBC will continue to have its own system of 
self-regulation). We now have a new super-regulator called Ofcom (the 
Office for Communication), which regulates the whole range of electronic 
media, both in terms of issues to do with commercial competition and in 
terms of what we might loosely call the public good – the social 
responsibility of the media, and their accountability to their audiences. 
(Details of this Act may be found at: http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/ 
acts/acts2003/20030021.htm.) 
In fact, the Communications Act represents a complex balance of deregula-
tion and re-regulation. On the one hand, it provides an extension of the 
government’s commitment to the so-called ‹free market› in cultural goods 
– in effect, to privatisation. For example, the Act loosens some of the 
previous regulations on cross-media ownership, so that it will now be 
possible for Rupert Murdoch to own a national terrestrial television channel 
in addition to owning the sole platform for satellite television in the UK 
and a couple of its leading daily newspapers (as well as his growing 
international media empire). 
On the other hand, however, the Act has to be seen to be addressing the 
social responsibility of the media – and not least, to address some of the 
continuing controversies about the apparently harmful effects of the media 
on children. Yet it seeks to accomplish this in a relatively novel way, by 
attempting to delegate responsibility for regulation from the public sphere 
of the state, or of government, to the private sphere of the individual 
‹citizen-consumer›.  
In doing so, the legislation acknowledges the fact that centralised regula-
tion has become increasingly difficult to achieve. This is partly a result of 
the advent of new technologies: traditional forms of regulation are much 
harder to sustain in an age of multi-channel television, digital video and the 
internet, which offer unprecedented possibilities both in terms of the 
distribution of media content, and in terms of access. However, it also 
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reflects the difficulty that regulators face in terms of legitimacy: their 
legitimacy depends upon appearing to speak on behalf of society as a 
whole, to be upholding what are seen to be ‹community standards›, and yet 
in contemporary multicultural, fragmented societies, with a growing politi-
cal commitment to ‹free speech›, this seems to be more and more difficult 
to achieve (Thompson and Sharma, 1998). 
Both on technological and on ideological grounds, therefore, media regula-
tion is increasingly having to move towards an emphasis on consumer 
autonomy. Rather than restricting access to material that is deemed to be 
morally harmful, it is increasingly recognising citizens’ rights to make 
informed decisions on their own behalf about what they should see or hear 
or read. However, the crucial point here is that these decisions should be 
informed: if people are to be trusted to make decisions for themselves, then 
they have to be shown to be competent to do so – and if they are to be 
competent, then they need to be properly informed and educated. They 
have to become – indeed, learn how to be – competent consumers. 
Hence, a key part of the remit of Ofcom, the new regulatory body, is to do 
with what it calls ‹media literacy›. A clause in the Communications Act 
gives Ofcom responsibility for ‹promoting› media literacy – and it has 
come to define media literacy, in rather generalised terms, as the ability to 
‹access, understand and create› media. Media literacy is to some extent 
inevitably framed here as a matter of self-protection, of being able to filter 
out or deal with things that might be found inappropriate or unwelcome – 
and thus there is a moral discourse (or a discourse about media effects) that 
continues to inform the debate. Yet in practice, media literacy is being 
defined rather more broadly, as a kind of cultural competence – a matter of 
understanding how the media work, of being able to access and evaluate 
what you see, and to match it to your needs as a consumer. In this sense, 
the term ‹media literacy› may come close to the German expression 
‹Medienkompetenz› – media-competence. 
Education is seen here as one (although by no means the only) way of 
‹promoting› media literacy; and to this extent, media education is now 
achieving a degree of recognition and support from government that is 
quite unprecedented. Indeed, the British Minister for Culture, Tessa Jowell, 
has even gone on record as saying that media literacy will be ‹as important 
to children’s lives as citizens’ as other school subjects like science and 
mathematics – a claim that met with predictable criticism from the 
conservative press (Jowell, 2004). Although Britain has a very long history 
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of media education, there has been an uphill struggle over the past several 
decades to convince the government of the need for children to study the 
modern media; and so for those of us who have worked in this field for 
many years, this is (to say the least) an extraordinary development.  
How – or indeed whether – this educational dimension will be carried 
through remains to be seen. Significantly, the drive to promote media 
literacy comes from the Ministry of Culture and not from the Ministry of 
Education (the Department of Education and Skills), which has long proven 
very resistant to media education, particularly in the context of the National 
Curriculum. In this paper, however, I want to focus more on the 
implications in terms of media regulation; and in particular, on how such 
moves construct or define the child. In some ways, this shift towards 
‹consumer sovereignty› in media regulation could be seen as a form of 
democratisation; although, as I shall argue, it could equally be regarded as 
merely a more subtle form of governance.  
 
The Politics of Fat 
There are undoubtedly some interesting paradoxes here. For example, one 
of the most hotly contested debates in the UK over the past couple of years 
has been about the media’s role in childhood obesity. There is growing 
concern, as in many other countries, about the rise in childhood obesity, 
and the future implications for the funding of the health service. The fat 
child has become a new kind of folk devil, a rapacious, insufficiently 
socialised monster.  
As is often the case in such debates, commentators tend to blame the 
media. In fact, there may be many complex reasons for the rise in obesity. 
One of them may be that the government is so obsessed with pushing up 
educational standards that it has seriously cut back on the amount of time 
children spend doing physical education in schools. But – as with violence 
– blaming the media always provides an easy option, and it gets attention 
for politicians who need to be seen to be ‹doing something› about the 
problem. So there have been mounting calls for the government to regulate 
the advertising of so-called ‹junk food› to children – and some critics point 
to countries like Sweden, where all advertising aimed at children is banned 
(at least on terrestrial television).  
In practical terms, this call to ban such advertising raises some quite 
difficult questions – not least to do with how you define ‹junk food›. (For 
example, advertisers are keen to point out that fruit juice is higher in sugar 
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content, and more harmful for teeth, than sugary soda drinks; and they 
argue that food is only ‹junk› when consumed in excess, and to the 
exclusion of other foods.) Obesity is clearly not only a matter of particular 
foods, but about overall diet and about levels of activity. As a result, it 
would be quite difficult for government to provide a clear and sustainable 
rationale for what is to be banned, and why. 
However, this debate also raises bigger issues about the influence of 
advertising. As with the debate about sex and violence in the media, 
children tend to be defined here as innocents in need of protection – as 
somehow at risk of being corrupted by the powerful influence of the media. 
Here we find the classic image of the incompetent child – the child that is 
too immature, too irrational, too inexperienced, too cognitively undeve-
loped, to know what is happening or to be able to resist it. Despite 
developments in academic research and in the media industries themselves, 
it is this construction of the child that continues to dominate the public 
debate about children and the media. 
Nevertheless, research on the influence of advertising, and particularly on 
how people make food choices, suggests that this is a rather more 
complicated issue. While there is a considerable amount of debate on the 
matter, many researchers argue that advertising is actually a relatively 
insignificant influence on food choice, compared with issues such as cost 
and availability and the amount of time people have to cook and go 
shopping. Indeed, this was broadly the conclusion of Ofcom’s own review 
of research on the matter (Ofcom, 2004). More to the point, research also 
tends to show that children are well aware of the persuasive intentions of 
advertising from a relatively young age: again, there is some debate about 
the matter, but it is generally agreed that by the time they reach the age of 
eight, most children are capable of mobilizing quite a cynical discourse 
about advertising (Young, 1990). I have interviewed children who will 
describe at length and in great detail, and with a good deal of hilarity, how 
advertisements are full of lies, about how the products they are selling are 
really rubbish, and about how the claims of advertising are always 
exaggerated and false (e. g. Buckingham, 1993: Chapter 7). 
At least on the face of it, children are very keen to present an image of 
themselves as entirely competent – as more than able to see through the 
false claims of advertising, and capable of making rational decisions about 
what they buy. Of course, one can see why it would be in their interest to 
do so – not least because they are bound to be aware of the public discourse 
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that presents them as quite the opposite. By displaying their expertise as 
critics of advertising, children are effectively answering back to the public 
debate. 
In fact, I would argue that there are some limitations to this competence or 
‹media literacy›. There is a rather superficial cynicism which children can 
easily assume when they talk about advertising – although the same is 
undoubtedly true of adults. Of course, the fact that you can appear to be 
cynical about something does not necessarily mean that it does not 
influence you. I would also argue that children are less aware of some less 
visible forms of advertising, such as sponsorship, branding and product 
placement – let alone the ways in which the internet is used for commercial 
gain, for example by gathering consumer information (see Seiter, 2004). 
However, I doubt that children are necessarily any less aware of these 
things than the majority of adults. 
Where does this leave us in terms of the public debate? One possible 
response is precisely to assert the competence of children – to argue that 
children are not so easily influenced, and hence that banning advertising (or 
a particular kind of advertising) probably would not have the desired effect 
in terms of changing their eating habits. This argument puts researchers in a 
slightly uncomfortable alliance with the advertising industry, which of 
course is also keen to do whatever it can to resist the calls for stricter 
controls. In the advertising industry, as in the media industries in general, 
there is a very strong official rhetoric about children – a view of children as 
‹media-savvy›, as sophisticated, discerning and demanding – in short, as 
competent consumers (see Buckingham et al., 1999). Indeed, there is a 
striking coincidence here between researchers’ construction of the media 
literate child and the commercial construction of the competent child 
consumer – between a liberal, democratising rhetoric, and a market-driven 
rhetoric that seeks to assert children’s consumer sovereignty.  
At the time of writing, it is hard to tell whether the British government 
actually will ban junk food advertising – or any advertising – to children. In 
fact, the media regulator Ofcom has publicly argued that it should not; 
although some government ministers are keen to assert the need for 
‹action›. The practical difficulties – and the potential for legal battles – are 
quite considerable. More to the point, the government’s central commit-
ment to neo-liberal economic policies makes it reluctant to interfere in the 
‹free market›: here again, its preference is for self-regulation rather than 
control from above. 
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What the government is doing, and will continue to do, is to assert the need 
to ‹promote media literacy›. To be cynical, one could argue that this is a 
way of ‹passing the buck›: since the government is not going to exercise 
control, people will have to do it for themselves. If we have an audience of 
informed consumers, so the argument goes, it won’t really matter if Rupert 
Murdoch controls the British media. Likewise, it isn’t really necessary to 
control advertising, because we have competent consumers who are 
perfectly capable of making up their own minds about what they should 
buy. Yet, as I have suggested, this could equally be seen as a democratising 
move: rather than paternalistically insisting that it knows what is best, and 
that it will tell people what to do, government offers a kind of autonomy, 
and the opportunity for people to make decisions on their own behalf.  
 
The Limits of the Self-Regulating Consumer 
There are two immediate difficulties with this emphasis on competence and 
self-regulation, however. The first is to do with who is actually being 
defined as the consumer (or the ‹citizen-consumer›) here – particularly 
when it comes to children. In practice, the state appears to be passing 
responsibility for regulation not so much to children but to parents, and also 
to some extent to teachers. It is parents (and less directly teachers) who will 
now be primarily responsible for regulating children’s media consumption, 
and for ensuring that they behave in an informed and responsible way.  
As Sonia Livingstone has pointed out in relation to the internet, this is quite 
problematic in a situation where many parents may actually be rather less 
‹media literate›, or simply less engaged in new media, than their children 
(Livingstone and Bober, 2004). It is particularly difficult in the context of a 
broader shift that is happening – at least in liberal capitalist countries – 
towards a democratisation of relationships within the family (Silva and 
Smart, 1999). As the preferred mode of childrearing has shifted from an 
authoritarian to a ‹pedagogical› mode, based on reasoning and discussion, 
it would seem less and less realistic to expect parents to be preventing their 
children from playing violent video games or surfing inappropriate sites on 
the internet. This shift in the locus of control appears to place a burden on 
parents that many of them are not equipped or even willing to exercise (see 
Buckingham and Bragg, 2004). 
Secondly, the discourse of ‹media literacy› provides a normative view of 
how good, responsible citizens should relate to the media. Implicitly or 
explicitly, we are urged to aspire to the condition of being wise consumers, 
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or rational viewers – and in the process, elements of emotional investment, 
or of pleasurable intensity, are implicitly seen as dangerous, and as 
something to overcome or to disavow. In effects, the discourse offers an 
‹adultist› definition of media literacy – or media competence – albeit one 
which it would probably be hard to apply to the majority of real adults. 
Furthermore, there is clearly a social class dimension to this definition. My 
own research suggests that there are significant differences in terms of 
children’s media access, uses and interpretations that are partly determined 
by social class (Buckingham, 1993). Attempting to claim a particular mode 
of engagement with media as ‹more literate› is normative – and ultimately 
runs the risk of presenting middle-class ‹educated› taste as the norm. 
Indeed, there is a real danger here in privileging a kind of superficial 
cynicism, which middle-class children in particular are often very fluent in 
adopting – a position which in the classroom often becomes implicated in 
the game of teacher-pleasing (Buckingham et al, 1990). Ultimately, then, 
there is a risk that the notion of ‹media literacy› favours a rationalistic 
model – a normative ‹adult› notion of the sophisticated, media-smart 
consumer that actually belies the complexity and diversity of children’s 
engagements with media. 
However, there is a broader issue at stake here too. The emphasis on media 
literacy could be seen as part of a broader strategy of ‹responsibilisation› – 
of making people individually responsible for things from which the state 
seems to have retreated. Another example here would be the UK govern-
ment’s recent redefinition of the unemployed as ‹jobseekers› – a definition 
that constructs people without work as active, choosing, autonomous 
citizens who can take charge of their own lives, even if the conditions that 
keep them unemployed may in fact be far beyond their control (Dean, 
1998). This strategy of ‹responsibilisation› seems to be particularly 
prevalent in the so-called caring professions and in education; and it is 
particularly apparent in the popularity of self-help literature, which 
similarly encourages readers to act on themselves to improve their lives 
(Rimke 2000). The emphasis here is on the exercise of personal autonomy 
– rather than on the operation of the state – as the means of ensuring 
individual well-being. 
This critique derives in turn from a broader analysis of the ways in which 
government, or the management of populations, has shifted in ‹late 
modern› liberal democracies. This account is broadly influenced by the 
approach of Michel Foucault (e. g. Foucault, 1977), and it is developed by, 
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among others, the British sociologist Nikolas Rose (1999). The argument 
here is that the state has shifted from government to governance – from an 
authoritarian mode of control to one that is based on self-regulation, and 
even self-surveillance. According to Rose and others, this is the only form 
of control that is compatible with liberal democracies’ ideological emphasis 
on individual autonomy. It is argued that neo-liberal regimes have ‹rolled 
back› the boundaries of the welfare state, not in order to remove power but 
to further embed it at the level of the individual. They govern less through 
the formal institutions of the state, and more through forms of ‹expertise› 
that seemingly lie beyond it – for instance, in the 'caring professions', in the 
media or the family – and that encourage action on the self, by the self.  
What Anthony Giddens (1991) rather benignly sees as ‹self-reflexivity› or 
the ‹project of the self› is seen from this perspective as a rather more 
sinister – or at least less apparently empowering – form of control, or even 
of oppression. For in requiring individuals to determine their own lives, to 
secure their own happiness and self-fulfilment, rather than looking to the 
authority of the state or religion or traditional morality, governance places a 
burden on us that we may not all be equally able or even willing to bear. 
From this perspective, placing an emphasis on competence in public policy 
is another form of responsibilisation. Competence comes to be seen as a 
kind of prerequisite for the self-regulation and self-government that modern 
liberal democracies require. The media-competent, media-literate consumer 
is the one who learns to regulate their own behaviour, to behave rationally 
and responsibly in line with the demands of government. The competent 
consumer is already a ‹good little citizen›, who does not need to be told 
what to do, because he or she already knows. 
 
Beyond Media Competence 
This Foucauldian argument provides a kind of meta-critique of con-
temporary policy-making, but it is hard to see what kinds of practical 
interventions it might permit or encourage. Indeed, it may prove quite 
paralysing when it comes to contributing to public policy debates of the 
kind I have described. Clearly, researchers should not be solely driven by 
the political imperatives of public debate; but they also need to be able to 
contribute to those debates in ways that might make a practical difference. 
As I have implied, research and debate about children’s relationships with 
media have been caught in a rather polarised, either/or argument that is 
ultimately quite unproductive. On the one hand, we have a construction of 
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the incompetent child, the child as vulnerable innocent, as media victim; 
and on the other, we have the celebration of the competent child, the child 
as sophisticated, media literate, autonomous. As I have suggested, both of 
these images – the innocent child and the wise child – are equally romantic, 
and indeed sentimental; and in some ways, they are two sides of the same 
coin. Attempting to intervene in public policy debates about the meaning of 
‹media literacy›, and the ways in which it might be effectively promoted – 
as I and my colleagues are currently attempting to do (see Buckingham, 
2005) – requires a more pragmatic approach. It also requires us to address 
some fundamental – but nevertheless very difficult – questions.  
If children are indeed already competent, there seem to be few grounds for 
suggesting that there is anything they do not know. Indeed, to do so would 
appear merely patronising. However, there undoubtedly are things children 
– and indeed many adults – do not know about the media, particularly 
about how the media operate as industries. The imperatives of policy-
making require a degree of certainty about what this knowledge is, and 
some commitment to the idea that people (both adults and children) need to 
acquire it. 
Likewise, if we are seeking to ‹promote› media literacy, we need some way 
of understanding how media literacy develops or is acquired. Children are 
not born competent, they gradually become competent – and indeed, one of 
the ways in which they do this is by observing and imitating adults. While 
acknowledging the limitations of normative, a-social theories, we clearly 
need a theory of development that will enable us to understand this process. 
We also need a theory of instruction that does not regard education as 
merely an unwarranted, paternalistic, even authoritarian intrusion on 
children’s autonomy. 
The discourse of competence or literacy (like discourses of rights and 
citizenship) inevitably tends to universalise. But policy also requires us to 
differentiate between individual children, or between social groups: it 
requires us to recognise that opportunities to acquire and exercise com-
petence depend upon social circumstances, and that differences in those 
circumstances might result in different ‹levels› of literacy. Furthermore, it 
requires us to recognise that there may be aspects of the media that people 
do not wish to see or experience or know about, and from which they may 
ask for protection – such as pornography or racist propaganda. Can we 
necessarily assume that individuals are able to self-regulate effectively, or 
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even that they are best placed to judge what they need, or what is good for 
them?  
For some, these issues might seem self-evident. Yet they go against the 
grain of what I have argued is a growing orthodoxy around the notion of 
children’s competence. Indeed, it has become almost impossible to ask 
such questions from a sociological perspective: terms such as development 
and protection – and, in some respects, even teaching – have increasingly 
come to be regarded as almost politically incorrect. We should certainly 
beware of any automatic assumption that incompetence is a necessary 
condition of childhood; but we should equally beware of merely 
celebrating children’s competence.  
The emphasis on media literacy within current regulatory policy could be 
regarded as democratic, and even as liberating or empowering for children. 
Yet there is a danger that we buy into an ‹adultist›, rationalistic, normative 
conception of competence that is not simply unrealistic, but also limits 
what we mean by competence and who is able to get access to it. Before we 
leap to construct children as already competent, we need to be careful that 
we do not merely seek to redefine children as adults – or rather to redefine 
them in terms of a certain fantasy about how adults ought to be. 
 
Note 
This article is based on a paper presented at the conference ‹Beyond the 
Competent Child›, held at the Royal Danish School of Educational Studies, 
Copenhagen, in November 2004. See Brembeck et al. (2004). 
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